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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 11-4563
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
PAUL F. DSCHUHAN,
Appellant
__________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal No. 2-11-cr-00106-001)
District Judge: Honorable David S. Cercone
__________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
December 17, 2013
Before: JORDAN, VANASKIE, and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges
(Filed: March 4, 2014)
_____________
OPINION
_____________
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.
Paul Dschuhan (“Dschuhan”) pleaded guilty to one count of interference with
commerce by threats or violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951. The United States
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania sentenced him to 27 months’

imprisonment, followed by 2 years of supervised release. Dschuhan filed a timely pro se
notice of appeal. We appointed counsel, who subsequently moved to withdraw pursuant
to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that all potential grounds for
appeal are frivolous. Dschuhan filed a pro se brief in response. For the reasons that
follow, we will affirm the judgment and sentence of the District Court and grant the
motion to withdraw.
I.
In March 2010, Dschuhan, a parole agent for the Pennsylvania Board of Probation
and Parole, approached his parolee to burglarize the home of an alleged drug dealer, turn
over the cash proceeds to Dschuhan, and keep or re-sell any contraband obtained in the
burglary. Dschuhan threatened the parolee with the possibility of jail if he did not
cooperate. The parolee relayed Dschuhan’s plan and threats to an FBI agent, who over
the following months monitored dozens of communications between the parolee and
Dschuhan. Eventually, in accord with the FBI’s instructions, the parolee pretended to
commit the planned burglary and delivered approximately $3,000 in cash to Dschuhan,
whom the FBI then arrested. After Dschuhan made a full confession regarding his
involvement in the plot, he was charged by information with one count of interference
with commerce by threats or violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951.
On June 8, 2011, Dschuhan waived indictment and entered a plea of guilty to the
information without a plea agreement. The Presentence Report (PSR), as modified by an
addendum, cited U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1, which provides the base offense level for several
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crimes including extortion under color of official right.1 Here, because the extortion was
committed in furtherance of a burglary of a residence, the appropriate cross-reference
was to § 2B2.1(a)(1), which prescribes a base offense level of 17. The base offense level
was increased by 1 because the burglary involved a loss of between $2,500 and $10,000,
and by another level because it involved the taking of a controlled substance, both of
which are “specific offense characteristics” under § 2B2.1(b). The PSR also
recommended a 2-level increase for “abuse of trust” under § 3B1.3 and a 3-level decrease
for timely acceptance of responsibility under § 3E1.1. These calculations resulted in a
total offense level of 18, a Guideline imprisonment range of 27 to 33 months, and a
period of supervised release of up to three years.
At sentencing on December 12, 2011, the District Court adopted these
calculations and noted that Dschuhan did not move for further departures. After hearing
from witnesses, Dschuhan’s attorney, and counsel for the Government, the District Court
considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and made an individualized
assessment of Dschuhan’s circumstances. The District Court then imposed a sentence of
27 months’ imprisonment and two years of supervised release.
II.
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Because Dschuhan was a public official, this resulted in a base offense level of
14. Section 2C1.1, however, includes a “cross reference”, which provides for a
substitution of a higher offense level where (1) the extortion occurred in furtherance of
another criminal offense, and (2) the base offense level for conspiracy to commit that
separate offense would be higher than the base offense level prescribed by § 2C1.1 itself
(i.e., higher than 14).
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The District Court had jurisdiction over this case under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
Counsel may seek to withdraw from representation if, “after a conscientious
examination” of the record, Anders, 386 U.S. at 744, he or she is “persuaded that the
appeal presents no issue of even arguable merit.” 3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(a). If we concur
with this assessment, we “will grant counsel’s Anders motion, and dispose of the appeal
without appointing new counsel.” Id.
When presented with an Anders brief, our inquiry is two-fold: “(1) whether
counsel adequately fulfilled [Third Circuit L.A.R. 109.2(a)’s] requirements; and (2)
whether an independent review of the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.” United
States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001). The Anders brief must “satisfy the
court that counsel has thoroughly examined the record in search of appealable issues,”
and also “explain why the issues are frivolous.” Id. While “[c]ounsel need not raise and
reject every possible claim . . . at a minimum, he or she must meet the ‘conscientious
examination’ standard” from Anders. Id. If we find that “the Anders brief initially
appears adequate on its face,” in the second step of our analysis we will “confine our
scrutiny to those portions of the record identified by . . . [the] Anders brief,” as well as
“those issues raised in Appellant’s pro se brief.” Id. at 301.
III.
Counsel's Anders brief demonstrates that the requirements of our Local Rule
109.2(a) have been fulfilled, thus satisfying step one of Youla. The brief reflects a
thorough examination of the record, helpfully directing our attention to possible
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appealable issues and applicable portions of the record. Counsel correctly found no
appealable issues with regard to Dschuhan's guilty plea or sentencing. Therefore, we turn
our attention to step two, and our independent review of the record, taking guidance from
the Anders briefing.
Dschuhan has filed a pro se brief raising only ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
arguments. “[C]laims of ineffective assistance of counsel are ordinarily not cognizable
on direct appeal. The proper mechanism for challenging the efficacy of counsel is
through a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.” United States v. Tobin, 155 F.3d 636,
643 (3d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Thus, Dschuhan’s arguments here are not
cognizable and do not present non-frivolous grounds for appeal.
IV.
In conclusion, we find that counsel’s Anders brief reflects a conscientious
examination of the record. Our independent review of the submissions, including
Dschuhan’s brief and the Government’s response to it, confirms that there are no nonfrivolous grounds for appeal. We will affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence,
and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.
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